# 12 guides to securing coding agents and the endpoints they run on

GUIDES, read 12 Nov 2026

**The short answer.** The guides cover securing coding agents on developer laptops and getting control of AI agents on endpoints: a first inventory, what agentless means, local MCP servers, browser agents, writing an agent policy and where EDR stops. Each guide cites its sources and the date they were read.

- [Securing Claude Code on developer laptops](/guides/claude-code-security/): Claude Code ships a permission system, an optional OS sandbox (Seatbelt on macOS, bubblewrap on Linux), hooks, MCP allowlists and OpenTelemetry export.
- [Securing Cursor on developer machines](/guides/cursor-security/): Cursor's agent reads files and edits workspace files without approval, asks before shell commands and MCP calls, and offers three Run Modes plus a sandbox.
- [Securing GitHub Copilot agent mode and the cloud agent](/guides/github-copilot-agent-mode-security/): Copilot agent mode in VS Code approves terminal commands, MCP tools and URLs, but network access defaults to on (chat.agent.sandbox.network.allowNetwork is true).
- [Securing OpenAI Codex CLI on developer laptops](/guides/codex-cli-security/): OpenAI's Codex CLI runs commands in an OS-enforced sandbox with network off and writes limited to the workspace by default, plus an approval policy for leaving it.
- [Securing Google Gemini CLI on developer laptops](/guides/gemini-cli-security/): Google's Gemini CLI documents sandboxing through Seatbelt, Docker, Podman, gVisor and a Windows native option, but tools.sandbox defaults to undefined and Trusted Folders is disabled by default.
- [What coding agents can touch on a developer laptop, and which controls ship with each](/guides/coding-agents-on-developer-laptops/): Claude Code, Cursor, GitHub Copilot agent mode, Codex CLI and Gemini CLI all run shell commands as the signed-in developer.
- [What agentless means on an endpoint](/guides/what-agentless-means-on-an-endpoint/): Agentless AI endpoint security can mean an MDM-pushed profile, a browser extension, an OS API sensor, existing EDR telemetry or a SaaS API connector.
- [Local MCP servers on the endpoint](/guides/local-mcp-servers-on-the-endpoint/): A local MCP server is a process an AI client starts on a laptop, usually over stdio, with the user's own file and network rights.
- [Browser agents and AI extensions](/guides/browser-agents-and-ai-extensions/): AI browser extensions and agentic browsers such as Comet, ChatGPT Atlas and Gemini in Chrome read pages and act inside the user's signed-in sessions.
- [AI DLP on the endpoint](/guides/ai-dlp-on-the-endpoint/): AI DLP on the endpoint applies data loss prevention to pastes, uploads and agent reads involving AI tools.
- [Shadow AI detection signals](/guides/shadow-ai-detection-signals/): Shadow AI detection on endpoints draws on five signals: process and binary inventory, browser extension inventory, network and DNS records, agent and MCP config files, and OAuth grants.
- [Agent surfaces explained](/guides/agent-surfaces-explained/): Six agent surfaces make up AI on a laptop: desktop AI apps, IDE assistants, command-line agents, MCP servers, browser extensions and SaaS copilots.

Short answers to 30 common questions are on the [FAQ page](/faq/).

## Sources

- Method: https://aiendpointsecurityranked.com/method/ (read 12 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 12 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://aiendpointsecurityranked.com/guides/
