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NEWS, 9 OCT 2026, read 12 Nov 2026

Claude Code plugin install could bypass a pinned commit SHA

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Anthropic's advisory GHSA-pq7j-f95f-qfcv covers the plugin install flow in Claude Code and Claude Desktop. The flow ran git checkout on a marketplace's pinned commit SHA but did not verify that the resulting HEAD matched. Someone controlling a plugin's upstream repository could create a branch with the same name as the 40-character SHA, and the checkout would land on the attacker's branch tip.

Anthropic rates the issue High at 7.7 on CVSS v4. It says exploitation needs a user to install a malicious plugin, pin it to a safe-looking hash, and a git host that allows SHA-shaped branch names. Anthropic credits Or Nevo Michrowski of Air Security. Standard auto-update has delivered the fix; manual updates need the latest version.

The lesson for endpoint teams is that a pinned hash is only a control if the installer verifies it. Plugins run with the permissions of the agent that loads them, so a swapped plugin is code execution inside a tool that already holds repository access and often cloud credentials.

What to check: that developer machines are on the current Claude Code release, which plugin marketplaces are allowed in managed settings, and whether you have an inventory of installed plugins and the commit each one resolves to.

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Sources

  1. github.com, read 12 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 12 Nov 2026.