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NEWS, 30 OCT 2026, read 12 Nov 2026

Backdoored Claude Code extension build distributed through Cursor's marketplace

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Noma Security's research post describes a backdoored build of the anthropic.claude-code extension, version 2.1.313, that reached developer workstations through Cursor's extension marketplace before it was pulled. Noma says the attackers prepended a 66-line obfuscated block to the extension's entry-point bundle, so it ran when the IDE activated the extension, with no prompt or permission grant needed.

According to Noma, the payload collected host details and up to 40 environment variable names matching keywords such as KEY, TOKEN and SECRET, sent them over plain HTTP, started the SSH service, appended an attacker key to authorized_keys, opened a reverse tunnel and installed persistence through a LaunchAgent, cron job or scheduled task. Noma also says Cursor published remediation scripts for macOS and Windows.

This is ordinary supply chain code execution, not a prompt attack. It matters because an AI coding extension runs inside the IDE with the developer's credentials, so one bad update reaches tokens, keys and repositories.

What to check: extension versions across the fleet (Noma gives commands for VS Code and Cursor), unexpected entries in authorized_keys, new LaunchAgents, cron entries or scheduled tasks named like system monitors, and outbound SSH from developer laptops. Updating alone does not remove the persistence.

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Sources

  1. noma.security, read 12 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 12 Nov 2026.